The possibilities for Afghanistan’s future are grim. From the American viewpoint, the situation appears to be considerably bleaker. It is possible that they could cut their misfortunes (2,400 Americans dead, $1 trillion spent) and leave, yet that would prompt another Vietnam minute in the long run, with helicopters lifting off the top of the U.S. Government office. Another approach is to return to a vigorous NATO-driven operation with 150,000 troops doing the real battling. In any case, no one on either side of the Atlantic is eager for that kind of responsibility, and the whole world grapples with significant Afghan exhaustion. However, the more exhaustive responsibility is that of Afghanistan’s own political setup to gain strength and momentum in order to realistically lead the country once the US does eventually decide to depart. That future is now also looking considerably dreary.
The fate of the National Unity Government (NUG) is uncertain; it is plagued with internal differences and dissension, and confronts a resurgent rebellion. There are a few alternatives being examined in Afghan and the global circle for how to best handle the political and established pressures that, if left unaddressed, could expand the danger of internal clashes and uncertainty in an officially delicate state. The main promising route forward is for President Ashraf Ghani and his Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah, to realize that the soundness of their legislature and nation depends upon their cooperation.
While the Afghan National Army (ANA) has up to this point kept the Taliban from catching and holding any significant populace focus, it is enduring high setbacks. In spite of the fact that the Afghan National Police (ANP) is in dire need of change, the solidarity in the government’s administration still cannot seem to handle the defilement, nepotism and factionalism inside it.
Political partisanship has penetrated each level of security contraptions of Afghanistan, undermining the structures of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and their ability to counter a developing revolt. While the Afghan National Army (ANA) has up to this point kept the Taliban from catching and holding any significant populace focus, it is enduring high setbacks. In spite of the fact that the Afghan National Police (ANP) is in dire need of change, the solidarity in the government’s administration still cannot seem to handle the defilement, nepotism and factionalism inside it. These shortcomings have assumed a noteworthy role in permitting Taliban’s progress countrywide, including Uruzgan’s capital, Tirin Kot.
Notwithstanding instability and political pressures, however, some progress has been made in settling the economy: financial changes and a tighter control over expenses have expanded household incomes. Practical development requires enhanced security, political strength and advancement in countering defilement. Endeavors to lessen defilement are firmly opposed by strong systems inside and outside the government. Other essential changes, especially of the appointive framework and organizations, without which future surveys will probably be as questionable as the 2014 Presidential challenge, have been hindered by the troubled relationship between the officials and the assembly. This state of affairs adds to legislative brokenness in Afghanistan.
However, with Abdullah confronting contenders from his own power base in the Jamiat-e-Islami, and Ghani consulting with Abdullah’s opponents, especially the Balkh Governor Atta Mohammad Noor, the NUG’s future is in question. Regardless of the possibility that Atta and other Jamiat pioneers were to join Ghani’s administration, the outcome could be greater dissatisfaction and internal dissension since the President is probably not going to acknowledge their request to mandate more power to the local-level forms of government.
International help, both financial and military, is vital for preventing guerilla progress. However, the nation’s solidness ultimately relies upon Ghani and Abdullah settling their disparities and cooperating to meet the numerous security, monetary and philanthropic difficulties that come up against the nation. Their cooperation is essential to counter the factors which aim to debilitate their administration and political survival.
Parliamentary and legislative board surveys have constantly been delayed because of security and political unsteadiness, and consequently a protected Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) can not be held to formalize the CEO’s position, as vowed in the NUG understanding.
Parliamentary and legislative board surveys have constantly been delayed because of security and political unsteadiness, and consequently a protected Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) can not be held to formalize the CEO’s position, as vowed in the NUG understanding. Proposals to end the political impasse initiated by former President Hamid Karzai and his partners are probably not going to find support with either the President or the CEO. Ghani doubts Karzai, while Abdullah is unwilling to risk losing his CEO position; neither one of them wants to cut short the NUG’s five-year presidency.
The New National Front of Afghanistan, a small group which was formed in January 2016, is driven by Karzai’s one-time fund serve, Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi. Ahadi once upheld Ghani’s decisions yet now backs an early race due to the fact that the NUG faces an “authenticity emergency”. The High Council of Jihadi and National Parties (Shora-ye-Aali Ahzab Jihadi wa Melli), another little restricted gathering of ex-mujahidin pioneers formed in 2015, is driven by former President Sebqatullah Mujaddadi and a Karzai VP, Karim Khalili. These are individuals who bolstered Ghani’s race but removed themselves to a great extent since they were barred from the government. Nonetheless, they appear to be keeping their choices open. Mujaddadi told a public interview: ‘We bolster the administration and need to ensure that the present circumstance does not prompt political flimsiness’.
Ghani likewise confronts resistance inside his own camp, principally from the first Vice President Dostum. Relations between the two have been stressed since the President requested an examination concerning the charged June 2016 mass captures of villagers, obliteration of property and killings of suspected extremists by Dostum’s local armies in Faryab area. The crack developed when Ghani required an examination in December into affirmations by Ahmad Ishchi, the VP’s adversary, that he had been persuasively kept in Dostum’s home in Sheberghan city and subjected to torment and rape. Dostum’s office denied the allegations, saying they were intended to dishonor him in the wake of a fizzled killing attempt. On 17 December, the lawyer general’s office said it had started a ‘fair-minded and straightforward examination in regard to the current occurrence with Mr. Ahmad Ishchi’.
The looming political crisis in Afghanistan will take on a fresh turn with the scheduled visit of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Bajwa. The General’s visit raises the possibilities for Afghanistan to raise its internal security concerns which in the Afghan government’s perspective has origins from sleeper cells operating from safe havens in Pakistan.
General Bajwa arrives with a mammoth task set for him. The Afghan prerogative is further emboldened with a heightened sense of US backing. Since assuming office, Trump has accused Pakistan of the very misdeeds being put forward by Afghanistan and by extension, India. The latter hit out at Pakistan’s alleged support to extremist outfits at the recent UN General Assembly meeting. Pakistan answered back with a list of terrorist plots originating from Indian soil. Another topic of discussion will be a proposed fencing of the Pak-Afghan border, a suggestion that Pakistan claims would solve Afghanistan’s complains of terrorists moving freely on either sides of the borders while also delivering on curbing unregistered Afghans entering Pakistan. Kabul has traditionally been opposed to any fortifying strategy on the border, given its official position of objecting the very idea of the Durand Line.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khwaja Asif singled out both the US and Afghanistan this week, as well as indirectly referred to India as being in the midst of a co-joint effort of shifting the blame about the War on Terror’s supposed failures on Pakistan. General Bajwa arrives in Kabul with political tensions unusually high between the two neighbors. Not only will he be expected to disperse Pakistan’s military position on the border issues but also raise Islamabad’s concerns. How the NUG deals with him and what concerns are raised will henceforth define the Pak-Afghan relations.