Identification of friends and foes is important in war planning. Preparing to thwart the designs of the enemy involves studying your own capabilities and that those of him. But then there is an old military adage that every plan meets that of the enemy, which means that San Tzu’s advice of knowing the enemy holds great value.
This is precisely what the state of Pakistan has to do. Like the nature of war, the anatomy of the enemy has changed. In order to win the war, the opponent must be carefully studied. The early morning attacks in Peshawar’s Warsak Road or the recent carnage in Quetta is a continuation of a protracted war imposed by non-state actors on the state of Pakistan.
The enemy is very different from the ones which Pakistan confronted in the conventional wars and battles it fought previously. The forces were on the Eastern flank. Their strength was known and hence devising defensive and offensive strategies was relatively easy.
Conventional forces are deployed in locations on the forward defended localities; their numbers, placement and types of weapons are collected through intelligence. Hence, the armed forces are in a position to prepare accordingly.
The main job of militaries around the world in peace time is to prepare for war. They do that through intense training courses and exercises. War clouds become conspicuous by observing the movements of armies or unusual flights by the air forces. Armies know what to defend and where to attack. Time and space become crucial principles in conventional engagements. Most importantly, the enemy can be easily discerned.
Pakistan has not engaged with its traditional adversary India in a battle since the events of Kargil. Yet, it is fighting a war in its own territory since the past 15 years. But this war is very different, and so is the enemy.
Miscreants wreaking havoc in the country are very different from soldiers of a standing conventional army, yet they quite similar to the people they are fighting against: citizens. They are neither deployed in a particular place nor do they have defense mechanisms per se because their strength lies in changing locations, methods and appearances.
Military with all its might can neutralize them partially by carrying out CTMILOPS and clear areas. Zarb E Azb and operations in Swat for that matter were undertaken to flush out militants from their strongholds.
Much to the credit of a standing army, the operations were very successful and this can be corroborated by a great decrease in the number of terrorist attacks. However, attacks do take place and result in casualties, despondency and fear. Many point fingers at security agencies and consider them incompetent to secure the lives of common citizens.
Thus, it becomes imperative to take into account a few issues that security agencies face in this irregular and asymmetric war. Firstly, the attackers are infested with an idea which makes them hate the state to an extent that they ready themselves to die. This leads to another problem. With no exit plan, the attackers enter the fray knowing very well that they would be killed. Hence, shooting down assailants in a firefight may not tantamount to infliction of great damage to the enemy. They have to be hunted down before they cause shock and awe; killing them after they have achieved their strategic aim will have no effect on non state actors.
Secondly, waging a war against the state has become less costly for challengers of state writ. It takes little effort and resources to convert a rookie into a mobile time bomb. However, the state will have to incur a lot of cost in stopping that indoctrinated mind.
Therefore, analyses which equate our numerical superiority and the possession of sophisticated weaponry with the occurrence of scant terrorist attacks are farcical. This enemy can be subdued but cannot be eliminated by kinetic operations alone.
Unlike conventional armies, insurgents do not see location as their centre of gravity. Instead, they derive their strength from ideas, leadership and handlers. As mentioned before, it is important to deny them the ability to spread terror in the country. The war will become costlier for them if their supporting elements, in all forms and manifestations are targeted.
Military operations are an important cog in Pakistan’s counter terrorism efforts but it is perhaps the only plank that the state is working on. The lack of focus on the non kinetic aspects will lead to such unfortunate incidents.
The state has to ensure that state actors must gain the upper hand. The hate for the state can be greatly lessened if the state has something better to offer. In the larger scheme of things, the government has to engage the citizens of Pakistan: they must be made ultimate beneficiaries of a peaceful country. The more this is done, the more untenable the idea to break the sinews of state will become. The idea which galvanizes the ranks of militants will become less sellable.
The war in Pakistan is far from over. Lambasting security forces for slip ups will only give the enemy a fresh crop of anti-state forces to use to their advantage. If the state fails to focus on the non-military aspects of this war, then success in battles would not translate into a final victory in war .
