Following the fall of Kabul, the Afghan Taliban are now confronting a strategic dilemma regarding how to deal with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The issue of the TTP has raised many eyebrows in Pakistan’s security community. The concern was felt in the wake of major jail-breaks by the Afghan Taliban which resulted in the release of the top commanders of the TTP including Mullah Faqeer. This release has put Pakistan in hot water, as it has been fighting against the group for over a decade and has been successful in its disintegration.
The TTP splintered back in 2014 owing to sectarian and leadership feuds among the groups. The disintegration, a no-bless moment for the TTP, prompted its top-tier leadership to move to Afghanistan. However, this movement was fast-tracked when Pakistan Army launched an operation against the insurgency. Thus, new militant phenomenon in Afghanistan’s jihadist landscape erupted leading to the formation of new militant groups. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a more brutal and barbarian group than TTP, led by Hafiz Saeed Khan, a former TTP commander, is one of many. The sudden emergence of the group threatened the monopoly of the Afghan Taliban on Jihad against the foreign occupation, and the TTP itself. This has encouraged both TTP and the Afghan Taliban to fight against a common enemy; ISKP. Multiple reports in the past hinted at the operational liaison between TTP fighters and Afghan Taliban to rout ISKP successfully from its strongholds of Kunhar and Nangarhar.
Since the reunification of splinter groups under the banner of TTP in 2019, the threat from the group has intensified, which is evident from the scope of its cross-border attacks. Following the merger, in August 2021 alone, TTP conducted 32 attacks against the Pakistani forces, the highest number ever recorded in any month. The group also carried out around 31 attacks after the visit of the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, until now. As per the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) July 2021 report, TTP has around 6000 trained militants in its fold on the Afghan side of the border. These attacks are not just problematic for the Afghan Taliban, but also for the group’s relations with its neighbor, Pakistan.
In the first week of this month, ISI chief paid a surprise visit to Kabul amidst the reports of internal fractures between the hardliners and moderates over the power distribution. His visit also came at a time when TTP has mounted its cross-border attacks to plague the security measures taken by Pakistan. Reports suggest that the ISI chief raised the issue of the TTP once again with the top Afghan Taliban leadership. The Afghan Taliban have reassured that they will not allow anyone to use the Afghan soil against Pakistan.
However, under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, for the first time, the TTP has called for an independent state in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
There is another aspect in this fiasco; religious bond based on historical events. The ousted Afghan Taliban leadership following the United States (US) invasion found refuge in erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It received immense support, rooted in the tribal code of “Pashtunwali” from local fighters who later went on to form TTP in 2007. Now the TTP is taking refuge in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Taliban are facing the same restrictions of moral obligation. However, this time, everything has changed. Afghan Taliban is not just a group, it is a de-facto government in Afghanistan, hoping for diplomatic support and recognition globally.
Would the new government be able to rout those who have provided them with a safe hideout in the past? The Afghan Taliban faces a deep dilemma; how to avoid animosity with TTP due to pressure from Pakistan and its ally China, and how to stop the group to conduct cross-border attacks? Pakistan has asked the Taliban to force the TTP combatants to capitulate their arms in a swap for amnesty, and they have suggested to have peace talks with them. Moreover, if the Afghan Taliban attempted to coerce the TTP, some of its followers may join the ISKP.
TTP publicly identifies two major goals. The movement’s primary goal was to support the Afghan Taliban in eliminating foreign occupation from Afghanistan. Secondly, the organisation wanted to implement Sharia rule throughout Pakistan. However, under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, for the first time, the TTP has called for an independent state in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Mehsud called Pakistan’s security agencies foes. He did not talk about carrying attacks against civilians. These significant modifications in the TTP’s approach appear to focus on gaining local populations’ support.
TTP might be attempting to capitalise on its own identity perception, one that might resonate with Pashtun tribal inhabitants and turn the terrorist group into an insurrection. TTP has learnt from the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) that a nationalist ideology can make it popular among the public. It is conceivable that the TTP is gaining inspiration from the Afghan Taliban’s stratagem of aiming to gain the support of tribal Pashtuns.
TTP’s new leadership might have understood that the Pakistan-Afghanistan border conflict is still a hot topic among Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line. It is worth noting that despite Pakistan’s insistence, the Afghan Taliban have refused to accept the Durand Line as a permanent boundary. Therefore, it is foreseeable that the Afghan Taliban are unlikely to concede to the boundary, as doing so would be unacceptable within the Pashtun groups in Afghanistan and cause a threat to the Taliban’s popularity. In this situation, the TTP may have extrapolated that forming an autonomous state in tribal regions and focusing only on the military would appeal to the Afghan Taliban and Pashtun tribes in Pakistan, therefore increasing its popularity.
The TTP nationalist ideology will most probably fail. The people of erstwhile FATA have seen the brutal rule of the TTP. If one had to choose, people would most certainly extend their backing to Pakistan’s military. A more important aspect of the story leads to the FATA reforms promised by Pakistan’s government. The erstwhile FATA’s citizens have already suffered a lot, dealing with violence for a long time. However, the government of Pakistan has not been able to rehabilitate and readapt FATA. The reforms could prove cardinal to resist the TTP’s merger with locals, which could incite uprisings against the government. The TTP has a clear strategy up their sleeves that will definitely work if the FATA reforms fail.
