Following the Pahalgam terrorist attack, India announced on 23 April 2025, that it would hold the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance. This unprecedented move, citing national security and accusing Pakistan of supporting cross-border terrorism, has drawn sharp condemnation. Given the lack of any such provision in the IWT for unilateral suspension, Islamabad considers India’s one-sided abeyance, which disrupts a vital resource, to be an Act of War. In turn, Pakistan suspended the Simla Agreement, transforming the bilateral dispute into a wider diplomatic crisis.

Per the IWT, the water agreement can only be mutually modified. Moreover, it is also against international customary law for an upper riparian state to obstruct the flow of the lower riparian state’s water. Besides, the IWT has stood the test of time. Not only has it withstood wars between the two hostile neighbours, but it has also weathered similar scenarios in the past during the Uri and Pulwama incidents in 2016 and 2019, respectively. Nevertheless, New Delhi has consistently used the treaty as a threat. For instance, New Delhi halted the IWT commission meetings after the Uri incident and declared plans to fully utilise its share of the eastern rivers following the Pulwama episode. In 2023, New Delhi formally notified Islamabad, through the World Bank, of its plan to put the treaty on hold and seek revisions. India has, therefore, historically employed water as a leverage point against Pakistan. Table 1 provides an overview of India’s weaponisation of water since 1960.

India’s Weaponisation of Water Post 1960

Table 1. Multiple Sources: Compiled by the Author

Pakistan’s agriculture and energy largely depend on the western rivers, namely the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab while Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej are controlled by India. The treaty also mandates the sharing of data on river flows and infrastructure development, which India has now halted. This prevents Pakistan from effectively planning and increases its risk of floods. Pakistan has already experienced the potential impact of India’s actions. In early May, water levels at a critical receiving point in Pakistan briefly plummeted by up to 90% when India initiated maintenance work on some of its Indus River projects. This incident provided a stark preview of the pressure Pakistan could face if India proceeds with plans to increase its water withdrawals.

Currently, India primarily operates run-of-the-river hydropower projects on the Western Rivers, meaning it lacks the substantial infrastructure needed to divert large volumes of water from Pakistan. This limitation stems directly from the IWT’s stipulations, which restrict significant dam storage. Consequently, in the short term, Pakistan faces no imminent danger from water diversion. However, in the medium to long term, India’s continued abeyance of the treaty can become a serious concern if it proceeds with constructing new water storage facilities. Notably, India commenced work on its hydropower projects soon after unilaterally suspending the treaty.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is deliberating a significant increase in India’s water withdrawals from this critical river system, potentially impacting Pakistani agriculture downstream. Following the treaty suspension, Modi directed officials to accelerate the planning and execution of projects on the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers, all primarily designated for Pakistan’s use under the existing treaty. Table 2 provides an overview of the Indian three-stage plan following the IWT suspension.

India’s Three-Stage Plan Post-IWT Suspension

Table 2. Compiled by the Author

Despite these plans, it will not be an easy task for India. Building and operating such large dams would be financially exhausting and time-consuming for New Delhi. Moreover, it carries significant political risk, as Islamabad would likely politically, and potentially militarily, contest such a development. Pakistan has developed a four-pronged plan to address India’s suspension of the IWT and is focusing on legal action, international pressure, and a reevaluation of the treaty’s terms. This strategy is outlined in Table 3.

Pakistan’s Four-Point Plan to Address India’s Suspension of the IWT

Table 3. Sources: Statements by Justice Aqeel; Multiple News Outlets (Dawn, NDTV, Dunya News). Compiled by the Author

Apart from these immediate legal and diplomatic steps, Pakistan is also committed to bolstering its long-term water security. This includes exploring and developing domestic strategies for enhanced water security and reducing its reliance on treaty-regulated flows. Such efforts encompass implementing comprehensive water conservation measures, improving irrigation efficiency, and potentially investing in strategic water storage solutions where feasible to mitigate the impact of reduced upstream flows and climate change.

Beyond the immediate dispute, India faces a strategic cost as a downstream riparian in the Brahmaputra river, which originates in China. China possesses the geographical and infrastructural capacity to leverage the river against India, a tactic Beijing has employed in the past political tensions. As Victor Zhikai Gao, Vice President of Beijing’s Center for China and Globalization, cautioned India Today, stating that nations “should not treat others in a way they themselves would not like to be treated.” He highlighted China’s upstream control of the Brahmaputra River, drawing a parallel to India’s position relative to Pakistan. Gao warned that if India pursues unilateral actions concerning shared water resources, it should be prepared for similar retaliatory measures, potentially leading to significant challenges for the country. Still, Mehebub Sahana, an environmental geographer at the University of Manchester, reproves that weaponising water is a “perilous strategy” that risks severe blowback. “The weakening of water diplomacy in South Asia is not just a regional threat; it endangers global climate security.”

India’s unilateral suspension of the IWT represents a dangerous escalation turning a historical cooperation framework into a tool of coercion. This move profoundly jeopardises Pakistan’s crucial water security and economic stability, setting a concerning global precedent for international water law and transboundary river management. Such actions erode regional stability and risk wider geopolitical fallout, potentially justifying similar moves by other upstream nations. Ultimately, restoring predictability and trust in the Indus basin hinges on de-escalation. While holding India accountable through legal and diplomatic means, Pakistan remains open to dialogue and treaty mechanisms, but only on the explicit condition of India’s return to IWT compliance. Looking ahead, a long-term resolution might involve a process to modernise the IWT, addressing emerging challenges like climate change and environmental flows, though this can only occur once the current crisis is resolved and trust is re-established within the treaty’s existing framework. Through these avenues, Pakistan aims to exert maximum pressure on India to revert to IWT compliance, while also bolstering its own long-term water security.