Just like two economists, it is also uncommon for scholars in the realm of nuclear strategy to agree on the manifestation of the theoretical concept(s) as the real-world events unfold, the externalities of those events and how they shape deterrence or compellence. The entire nuclear strategy predominantly revolves around these two concepts. For the readers who do not understand the concepts in strategic parlance, deterrence is the threat of use of force to prevent an adversary from committing an action while compellence is to coerce the adversary to do something or bring about a change of behaviour through the threat of use of force. However, it is rather an agreed-upon understanding that compellence is much harder to achieve than deterrence.
Nonetheless, India set out to compel Pakistan, yet again, on the night of 6-7 May 2025 with 75 jets hovering within its own territory and targeting nine locations across the international border and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Indian jets used standoff weapons to strike civilian locations inside Pakistan resulting in the death of 31 civilians, including children, as per the initial reports. In what is described as one of the most extensive aerial duels since World War II, Pakistan claims to have shot down six Indian jets, independent sources have confirmed three so far, including at least one Dassault Rafale. The aftershocks of that one hour’s aerial combat are felt from the Western capitals to the Asia-Pacific region, having far-reaching implications.
Pakistan could not be compelled, India does not seem to be conventionally deterred.
The Balakot strikes in 2019 marked a shift in India’s strategy, breaking what it calls the “strategic paralysis,” towards countering terrorism which it accuses Pakistan of supporting. Islamabad has consistently denied the allegations and sought an international neutral probe into the matter. The idea that non-state sub-conventional threats could be effectively countered without an all-out invasion of another country, case in point Afghanistan post 9/11, emanates from Israel’s aerial bombardment strategy against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq and Syria. Balakot 2019 was effectively a leaf out of Israel’s playbook, even using Israeli SPICE bombs, resorting to a conventional offensive against alleged non-state targets within the sovereign territory of another state. The Indian Air Force (IAF), however, was unsuccessful even at the tactical level, marking the first sign of a failed strategy. In “a very precise miss”, the IAF jets were unable to strike the only target they intended to hit in Pakistan. The satellite imagery showed the building still intact, although the SPICE bombs did manage to uproot some trees nearby. The strike itself was a manifestation that India had erred in embracing this strategy. It was never applicable in South Asia’s regional context as the balance of power and operational environment stand in contrast to the Middle East.
Whenever Israeli jets set out to bomb the target locations in Lebanon, Iraq or Syria, it is practically another training mission. Total air superiority, no interceptors expected, and rudimentary to non-existent air defence systems allow the pilots to reach the desired altitude and range unhindered, release the precision-guided munitions and return to the base. When IAF Mirage pilots managed to penetrate into Pakistan’s air space in 2019, after decoying and engaging Pakistan Air Force (PAF) interceptors at two separate and distant locations, the thought process bore no resemblance with Israeli pilots. They knew that the window of opportunity was limited. They could only remain in the Pakistani airspace for a few minutes before the warning pops up on their Radar Warning Receivers (RWRs) that they have been locked on by PAF jets. This was the first reminder that they were not in the Middle East and India is not Israel. Perhaps, it was the disarray, the rightfully overactive and chaotic, instead of a composed mind that made them drop the bombs in haste and return, leading to a failed mission. The next reminder came on the clear blue morning of 27 February 2019 when PAF, in a display of technical prowess and to the surprise of India, conducted six airstrikes in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK). The unscathed return of the PAF Jets while also managing to shoot down at least one Indian jet scrambled to intercept them and capturing its pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan was considered as a resolute response. Pakistan believed that it effectively responded to India’s attempt to push the threshold of confrontation below a nuclear conflict. In addition to credible nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence was restored by punishment. And it was believed that India would not push the limit again.
Come 2025 and apparently the only takeaway for India from the 2019 standoff was that the flaw in the strategy last time was crossing into Pakistan. This time the IAF jets stayed well within Indian Territory to engage targets inside Pakistan. The AASM Hammer bombs and SCALP-EG cruise missiles were launched and hit civilian targets, no surprise there. What came afterwards was a surprise indeed as the IAF pilots were not anticipating it. More than 100 km away from the international border, within Indian air space, PL-15 BVR missiles launched by the PAF jets downed six jets and a Heron-1 UCAV. Pakistan vowed to respond at the time and place of its choosing, which culminated in Operation Bunyan um Marsoos. It was a third comprehensive reminder that South Asia is not the Middle East. Israel’s strength in that region is due to relatively weaker states in its vicinity. It should not have taken Indian policymakers two standoffs, the loss of seven aircraft in total, a captured pilot and many lives to learn that it was never in the position to be a regional hegemon which could break international law with impunity.
There are several pertinent questions, however, which remain to be answered: Was it a rationally prudent strategy to begin with? Could India have compelled Pakistan to ensure that no more violent attacks happen in IIOJK, assuming that there is no support among the masses in Kashmir for the armed freedom struggle and all incidents of militancy in the valley are instigated or orchestrated by Pakistan? Is it even possible for Pakistan, a country fighting a gruelling, protracted war against terrorism on its western front? There has been a sharp increase in fatal terrorist incidents inside Pakistan over the last few years.
Data Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal
Even for the hard-to-achieve compellence strategy, the threat of the use of force is contingent upon the adversary’s willingness to change its behaviour. The incentive to comply with the demands of the challenger is to avoid punishment. In both the instances of 2019 and 2025, India’s stated objective, without any investigation, right from the beginning was to punish Pakistan. For the sake of argument, even if Pakistan had a stranglehold over the militancy, which is impossible as the Kashmir insurgency has substantial local support, the absence of a condition tied to the threat of punishment meant that there was no incentive whatsoever for Pakistan. India meant to inflict punishment regardless of the results of the still ongoing investigation and apprehending the actual perpetrators who remain at large. Indian strikes were a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty that it effectively responded to on both occasions as per its rights enshrined in the international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter. Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi seemed visibly surprised, almost as if he actually did not expect it, during his address to the nation that India only targeted terrorist infrastructures then why did Pakistan attack India in retaliation? What exactly did India in general and IAF in particular expect the 40 PAF jets they were seeing on their radars would do once the strike was conducted? The Indian PM’s statement is devoid of a basic understanding of International Relations and the concept of sovereignty, a precarious indicator in the context of a nuclear state. Any sovereign nation, let alone a nuclear power, would have responded to the blatant breach of sovereignty the way Pakistan did.
Resorting to the conventional domain to counter sub-conventional threats was never an effective strategy from the outset, as an Indian defence analyst and editor of Force Magazine Praveen Sawhney has reiterated on multiple occasions since Balakot strikes in 2019. In no circumstances, it could have brought the desired results for India as the underlying strategy was flawed, with too many missing variables for a quantifiable evaluation of its success. Yet digging himself deep into the commitment trap, PM Modi has vowed once again that India would strike inside Pakistan again in case of another terrorist incident. It chalks out a dangerous course for South Asian strategic stability on two fronts. First, it is setting a dangerous precedent and electoral politics imperative for subsequent governments in India, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) or otherwise. The Indian public at large would like to believe the state narrative that it is a successful strategy, putting political pressure and forcing every subsequent government to live by the word of PM Modi. Second, and perhaps more concerning, it allows the margins for global terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda and Islamic State, particularly their regional branches Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), or any of the several Indigenous secessionist movements in India, to exploit the Indian policy line and conduct large-scale violent attacks and bringing both nuclear-armed neighbours to war. Organisations like ISKP have a footprint in the region, consider both states as their enemy and thrive on chaos. A highly volatile combination, making them a common threat to every country in the region. Is India willing to allow South Asian peace and stability to be held hostage to the nefarious designs of global terror outfits? Would it declare war on Pakistan, without conducting a thorough investigation and presenting credible proof to the international community as it did after the Pahalgam incident, if any violent attack is carried out by these organisations?
The threshold of use of force is lowering while its intensity is increasing with every subsequent engagement. From February 2019 to May 2025, a pattern could be extrapolated that the threshold of previous conflict serves as the base or starting line for the next one. The 2019 threshold, air strikes inside mainland Pakistan, was the starting line and then some new trends were set during the conflict in 2025. If it continues then kamikaze drones and missile strikes on military installations are likely to set the stage in the next conflict, whenever it may happen. However, the net effect remains the same. Pakistan could not be compelled, India does not seem to be conventionally deterred. In a nuclearised South Asia, India is playing a very dangerous game of brinksmanship which it definitely cannot win, but everyone, including India, has much to lose.
