In 2023, Khan Muhammad Marri’s three family members including his wife and two children, initially believed dead, were recovered from Sardar Abdul Rehman Khetran’s private jail. At the time, Sardar Khetran was serving Balochistan’s Communication and Works Minister. Following the discovery, he was arrested but granted bail by a local court after three weeks. Khan Muhammad, a former bodyguard of Sardar Khetran who had left his service for unknown reasons and fled Barkhan, alleged that Sardar Khetran kidnapped his wife and seven children in response. Khan Muhammad also accused Sardar Khetran of killing his two young sons. This case exemplifies how powerful tribal chiefs (sardars) cruelly govern their fiefdoms and challenge the writ of the state (sarkar), ironically, often with the state’s implicit support.
Sardars, including the late Nawab Akbar Bugti, have maintained private jails where they keep and brutally torture prisoners. These inhumane jails lack windows and ventilation, leaving prisoners in darkness for years without access to medical care or proper hygiene, with only coolers for sanitation. Former prisoners recount sleepless nights due to the stench of urine and constant anxiety. Families often fear approaching courts or the media, or even speaking out, lest their imprisoned relatives face further harm. While Sardars perpetrate this barbarity, the state bears equal responsibility for politically backing them, which only amplifies their power and exacerbates the governance crisis in Balochistan.
The current nature of the sardari system is a legacy of the British Raj. Before British rule, it was more of a political entity, based on merit and competence, in contrast to the British-imposed “inherited” system. Sir Robert Groves Sandeman, Balochistan’s Governor General from 1877 to 1892, transformed it into an economic system by granting Sardars additional income, lands, and a levies force to secure their loyalty, thereby lessening their dependence on tribal social support. Under the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act of 1901, the British further empowered Sardars to control the local population by offering stipends, privileges, pensions, and grants. To consolidate their control over the masses, Sardars often kept their subjects illiterate and impoverished.
The state should empower local governments in Balochistan, which would, in turn, empower local people, gradually eroding the historical sociopolitical power of the Sardars as well as the narratives of nationalists and separatists.
After the establishment of Pakistan, Sardars continued to wield immense power and authority, even using force to collect taxes. For example, in the 1970s, eighteen people reportedly lost their lives near Sibi for failing to pay Sashak, the Sardar’s share of revenue earned by their clansmen. In tribal areas, owners of forty or more herd animals often must pay a tax to the local Sardar for access to grazing land and water. Moreover, Sardars frequently oppose development initiatives in tribal areas, including the construction of educational institutions and even the provision of electricity, in some instances.
Successive governments have largely maintained this colonial-era British sardari system, which has oppressed and deprived local people of basic rights and freedoms. In 1972, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, the first Chief Minister of Balochistan, attempted to abolish the sardari system, and the provincial assembly even passed a resolution in this regard, though it never became law. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also acknowledged the sardari system as a cause of underdevelopment. Thus, the sardari system was officially abolished by the System of Sardari (Abolition) Act of 1976. This act acknowledges the oppressive nature of the system as being against “democracy and equality” and an obstacle to the “economic advancement of the people.” Yet, Sardars remain de facto rulers in their fiefdoms, unaccountable and operating beyond the reach of state laws.
Practically, overcoming the power of Sardars will demand courage and bravery from the state (sarkar) given the complex political alliances within the province, particularly in the context of growing Baloch sub-nationalism and separatism. The state primarily supports these Sardars as a countermeasure against Baloch nationalists, believing it will prevent the latter from gaining control. However, this strategy inadvertently strengthens the nationalist and separatist narratives. Recognising this, Sardars also exploit this situation by presenting themselves as indispensable allies in suppressing separatists. Similarly, while the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and other separatist militant organisations may not pose an existential threat given Pakistan’s powerful military, the state’s backing of the cruel sardari system fuels the BLA and other separatists’ narratives, fostering mistrust between the state and its people. Ultimately, no military power can truly defeat its own people. Therefore, for the betterment of the populace and a stronger people-state relationship, the state must cease its support of Sardars as a crucial step before practically dismantling the system.
In this context, the development in Balochistan brought about by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) appears to be a threat not only to Pakistan’s external adversaries but also to the entrenched power of the Sardars. Balochistan’s development has the potential to diminish the Sardars’ influence and empower local populations, something they have resisted for centuries. The socioeconomic development of Balochistan could also help reconcile and rebuild the relationship between the people and the state. Moreover, the state should empower local governments in Balochistan, which would, in turn, empower local people, gradually eroding the historical sociopolitical power of the Sardars as well as the narratives of nationalists and separatists.
