The Russian economy has shown a degree of resilience that surprised some, considering the extensive Western sanctions. A key factor in this unexpected stability is the growing influence and evolving role of the BRICS coalition (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), now strengthened by new members. Initially established as BRIC in 2006 and expanded to BRICS with South Africa’s inclusion in 2010, the bloc has further solidified its position with the recent addition of Iran, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ethiopia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, with Indonesia joining in early 2025.

While President Putin noted at the 16^th BRICS conference in Kazan in October 2024 that over 30 nations expressed interest in joining, the impact of the already expanded bloc is becoming increasingly evident. Even before this expansion, BRICS’s economic clout was significant, surpassing the G7 in purchasing power parity (PPP) of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018. By 2024, BRICS’s share of the world economy had grown to an estimated 35%, compared to the G7’s 30%, with a collective net worth exceeding $28.5 trillion, roughly 28% of the global economy.

The unified stance of BRICS nations in not joining the Western sanctions campaign and even increasing trade with Russia highlights the bloc’s cohesion.

The sanctions impacted key sectors such as defence, banking, and energy.  The coalition has become increasingly significant in this regard. Russia has utilised the bloc’s potential to overcome Western sanctions. In 2021, Russia was third in terms of European Union’s (EU) imports and fifth in terms of EU exports. After the sanctions, Russia shifted its economic dependency on Europe and found new markets in Asia, mainly the BRICS nations.

Energy exports, such as natural gas and oil, provide the majority of Russia’s income. To fulfil its budgetary needs, Russia shifted its oil supplies to China and India. The Power of Siberia (PS-1 and PS-2) gas pipeline exports Russian gas, while the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a key route for supplying Russian oil to China. By 2023, Russia had already shipped 22.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China via PS-1. More recent data indicates a continued upward trend in Russian energy exports to China and India throughout 2024 and into early 2025. Russia’s oil exports to India surged to 1.9 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2023, and to China, they reached 2.3 mb/d (see figure 1), trends that have largely persisted into 2025.

Bilateral trade between Russia and India stands at approximately $65 billion, while trade with China is a staggering $240 billion. During a recent visit to China, the Russian foreign minister highlighted the effectiveness of multilateral frameworks like BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in overcoming challenges and the deep-rooted mutual support in their bilateral relations. India and China have undeniably become economic lifelines for Russia. While trade with other BRICS members like South Africa and Brazil is comparatively lower, focusing on sectors like fertilisers and food products, the overall economic engagement within the bloc provides crucial support to Russia. (See Table 1 for detailed trade between Russia and BRICS).

Table 1 Russia exports to BRICS members before and after sanctions

In the defence sector, China is supplying high-tech products such as chips and other components it needs to keep the Russian military production going. Iran, on the other hand, is exporting Kamakazi drones and ballistic missiles to support Russia’s war efforts, a claim they reject. In January 2025, the President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, landed in Moscow to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia underscoring the deepening cooperation between two of the world’s most heavily sanctioned nations. Furthermore, the revenue generated from energy export is used to keep the military-industrial complex to continue defence production. It is the BRICS nations that are now the top importers of Russian energy and the biggest contributors to Russian defence production.

Furthermore, the use of SWIFT, a global financial channel that makes it simple and quick to transfer money between nations, was prohibited for some banks in Russia. In 2014, the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), Russia’s internal financial transaction messaging system, was created in response. Though it is popular within the country, it is not as fast or secure as SWIFT. Russia and China have developed alternatives to SWIFT, including the SPFS and the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). Russia has urged the BRICS countries to create a new cross-border payments network in a major effort to thwart international sanctions and lessen reliance on the global financial system, SWIFT.  BRICS Pay, the digital currency which was presented during the 16^th BRICS summit, will further complicate matters for the West. The Russian bank, though it suffered as a smooth transaction was impacted, it sustained for three years, and is still resisting the sanctions.

The BRICS coalition’s influence extends beyond economics. Politically, the bloc presents a strong counterweight to Western dominance. Despite Western efforts to isolate Russia, it retains significant global influence, particularly as a perceived voice of the Global South. President Putin’s emphasis on multipolar diplomacy resonates with many nations. The 16^th BRICS summit in Kazan witnessed the participation of prominent leaders like Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, alongside around 20 other global figures, including Turkey’s President Erdoğan and UN Secretary-General António Guterres.

While BRICS’s role in finance is crucial for sanction mitigation, the limited global reach of SPFS and CIPS currently prevents them from being complete alternatives to Western financial infrastructure. Furthermore, during the maritime ceasefire agreement, the Kremlin said that the ceasefire would come into force only if restrictions imposed on trade finance operations were lifted. It highlights the difficulties Russian banks are facing in carrying out smooth transactions.

Furthermore, Russia still needs Western technologies in its defence sector. According to investigations, a sizable portion of Russian weapons, including advanced missile systems, still use parts made by American and European companies. When a Russian Iskander-K missile attacked a theatre in Chernihiv, Ukraine, on August 19, 2023, it was discovered to include parts manufactured by American and European companies. While Russia is utilising alternative supply chains, disruptions could still impact its defence production.

The coalition is growing day by day, with nations beyond the initial and recent additions expressing interest. This growing interest, even from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member like Türkiye, which has reportedly applied for membership, signals a significant shift in global power dynamics and raises serious questions in the West about the long-term effectiveness of sanctions. While internal differences in economic and political systems exist within BRICS, the shared interest in multilateralism and a desire to challenge the existing global order fosters cooperation. The intent for harmony between China and India, exemplified by their leaders meeting in Russia, further underscores this point. Russia’s experience provides a degree of confidence to other sanctioned nations, like Iran, to pursue independent foreign policies. The unified stance of BRICS nations in not joining the Western sanctions campaign and even increasing trade with Russia highlights the bloc’s cohesion. These developments increasingly suggest that the efficacy of unilateral and multilateral sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is being undermined, potentially impacting critical global agendas such as non-proliferation.