On 14 June 2023, the German government, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, launched the country’s first-ever National Security Strategy. It was a roughly year-long process spearheaded by Germany’s Foreign Office and included consultations with the Bundestag (National Parliament), scientists, members of the think tank community, associations, civil society representatives, non-governmental organisations, as well as the country’s allies and partners within Europe and beyond. Also, it merits attention that Germany’s efforts were primarily triggered in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Before delving into details, it is imperative to examine two overarching policy documents that overshadow Germany’s national policy: The European Union’s (EU) Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (approved March 2022) and NATO’s Strategic Concept (approved June 2022).

EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence

The policy was promulgated to reiterate a collective European resolve against Russian aggression in Ukraine but also the myriad of geopolitical shifts taking place across the world, including the rise of China, which the policy described as “a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival”. Thus, the EU as a whole views China simultaneously as a partner and a potent rival.

It declared that “war” had “returned” to Europe, thus heightening prioritised collective security and defence until 2030. Four actionable prongs were laid out in this policy by members of the European states, namely:

1. Act: Boost civil-military fusion in security and defence missions, development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, and strengthening of Command & Control structures, particularly Military Planning and Conduct Capability.

2. Secure: Synergise intelligence capacities under the EU Single Intelligence and Analysis Capacity framework, development of an EU Hybrid Toolbox to counter hybrid warfare threats (including the information environment) and robust expansion of cyber, space and maritime defence capabilities.
3. Invest: Increase spending in the development of next-generation capabilities in all operational domains and set up a Defence Innovation Hub within the European Defence Agency.
4. Partner: Reinforce strategic partnerships with NATO, UN, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), African Union (AU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); boosting cooperation with the United States (US), Norway, Canada, United Kingdom (UK) and Japan (to name a few likeminded countries) and tailored partnerships in Balkans, Latin America and Africa; set up an EU Security and Defence Partnership Forum.

As a follow-up to its aspirational programme, the EU released an implementation progress report in March 2023, which disclosed that significant progress was achieved with respect to the implementation of commitments. Some of the less-highlighted progress indicators include targeted sanctions against Russia and reduced dependence on energy imports from Russia. However, the report does acknowledge that ongoing and pending initiatives need to be accelerated, especially the mobilisation of political will from EU member states.

Germany’s National Security Strategy

The strategy finds visible congruence with the contours defined in the EU and NATO policy documents discussed earlier. The Federal Government of Scholz has repeatedly reiterated its belief in Atlanticism, with apparent tones of Eurocentrism, i.e. Eurocentric Atlanticism which maintains scepticism on the effectiveness of a Transatlantic security partnership with North America. Throughout the document, we can see that Germany considers Europe as its foremost zone of responsibility, with secondary importance given to external threats from West Asia and North Africa (or, as some call it, the Middle East and North Africa). Unsurprisingly, there is only passing mention of the significance of the “Indo-Pacific” construct, but only at a larger global level.

Although Germany’s first National Security Strategy resonates with the long-term assessments of the EU and NATO it is quite an underwhelming attempt at articulating a coherent posture.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has visibly jolted the minds of national security stakeholders in Germany, who construe President Vladimir Putin’s aggression as revisionist attempts to rekindle World War years of yore.

Broadly, the document can be divided into three distinct themes: (1) Mindfulness of History, (2) Acute Perception of the Present (guiding national posture) and (3) Action Plan.

The Scholz government acknowledges Germany’s historical role in and the subsequent guilt resulting from the “shoah”, i.e. Holocaust against Jews and reaffirms its “responsibility” for Israel’s right to exist. Secondly, there are brief expressions of gratitude to the US and unnamed European partners for helping Germany defend and then rebuild itself throughout the 20^th century (which, at the outset, appear as mere expressions of courtesy). The strategy also carefully appreciates efforts to remove historical misunderstandings with neighbouring France, with which there is growing convergence on strategic posturing.

As far as the current threat perception is concerned, the document mentions “‘zeitenwende”, the German term that refers to a watershed era of historical significance; authoritative sources of German strategic thought proffer that the connotation is more nuanced and signifies “a historical geopolitical shift”. This term was first used by Scholz in his address to the Bundestag in February 2022 following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, during which he said: “We are living through a watershed era (zeitenwende). And that means that the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before. The issue at the heart of this is whether power is allowed to prevail over the law. Whether we permit Putin to turn back the clock to the nineteenth century and the age of the great powers. Or whether we have it in us to keep warmongers like Putin in check. That requires strength of our own”. Germany gives itself a central role in contributing to Europe’s collective security, declaring that the deepening of the EU and expansion of Euro-Atlantic architectures (a reference to NATO) are cornerstones of the Scholz government’s security and foreign policies. These statements seem to confirm German and French ambitions for European strategic autonomy, as both neighbours believe the US is more fascinated with the trending “Indo-Pacific” theatre. This is evident from Germany’s desire for reforms within the EU which can facilitate the integration of Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and even Georgia; the current process of absolute consensus in decision-making by all members has been criticised by his government since the past year. He has also been cautious about engaging with the Americans on Ukraine, i.e. avoiding unintended escalation with Russia and decoupling with China to great national economic disadvantage.

With respect to the actual way forward (action plan), the Scholz government’s strategy is predicated on three prongs:

1. Wehrhaft (Robustness): Germany’s security is inter-linked with European partners and allies, and the German Federal Government will dedicate no less than 2% of its GDP for NATO; initially, this would be channelled through a special fund allotted to the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces). The increased spending would also be diverted toward critical infrastructure protection, capacity building, civilian protection, humanitarian assistance and also development. Germany will also steadfastly support arms control and disarmament initiatives, including through tighter regulation of arms exports.
2. Resilience: The strategy firmly supports multilateralism and places the United Nations (UN) at the core of its worldview. There is also a distinct rejection of attempts to “divide the world into spheres of influence”, which would be countered by the German state (while some would suggest this is an implicit reference to China, others, such as this author, believe this could equally apply to the US and other handful of partners involved in setting up different groupings and “minilaterals” in the Indian and Pacific Ocean countries). Cyber Space and Outer Space have been prominently highlighted as operational domains of interest; the Scholz government makes it clear that it will not only attribute malicious cyber actors interfering in its national cyberspace but will also impose sanctions against their patrons (this is most clearly a message to China and Russia); they would also expand the scope of its Space Situational Awareness Centre in view of the “strategic” dimensions of Outer Space through an inclusive partnership with players in the private sector.
3. Sustainability: There is repeated German rhetoric on carbon emissions, commitment to keep global warming at 1.5°C (as per Paris Agreement) and shifting toward greener alternatives in manufacturing and other sectors, not to mention efforts to promote global food security through diversified supply chains.

Assessment

An objective dissection of the Scholz government’s activities, published before the strategy itself, is an indictment against the bold aspirations mentioned therein. The delayed defence assistance to Ukraine, insufficient and delayed financing for the Bundeswehr, resumption of coal-power energy sources etc., point toward contradictions which are likely to belie and run counter to stated goals in the strategy.

In the larger security context, Germany has continued to lead the NATO exercise, Air Defender, since 2018, with its largest iteration taking place in June 2023. Ironically, air forces from the US (Air Force and National Guard) have the largest number of participating assets. It will be difficult for the Scholz government to set grounds for Eurocentric defence by graduating outside the wider American umbrella, nor are some of Germany’s other neighbours, including the US, appreciative of its independent open engagement with China.

Although Germany’s first National Security Strategy resonates with the long-term assessments of the EU and NATO (much to their relief), it is quite an underwhelming attempt at articulating a coherent posture. By design or otherwise, it leaves much for speculation, especially for countries in the “Indo-Pacific” construct, which were discussed comparatively less ambiguously in the 2020 Policy Guidelines promulgated by Scholz’s predecessor Angela Merkel.

As mentioned earlier, Europe remains at the heart of this strategy, and this is precisely why evaluating it from a global perspective would be difficult.