During a capstone seminar on warfare and aerospace strategy in June 2022, India’s incumbent Chief of Air Staff ACM Vivek Ram Chaudhari released the revised edition of the Indian Air Force (AIF) service doctrine. The 2022 IAF Doctrine, released partially for the public in January 2023, comes a decade after the 2012 edition was released by the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It encapsulates the contrasting political, security, and economic dynamics generated during the two back-to-back tenures of incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the centre. Notably, from a Pakistani perspective, these tenures witnessed India transform from a contemporary South Asian country to one that is more assertive and harbours aspirations to become a regional power.
These aspirations have been greatly complimented by the central government and by the Indian Armed Forces, including the IAF, which has been famed for carrying out purported “surgical strikes” in Myanmar (2015) and Pakistan (2019). By and large, the Indian Armed Forces’ increasing and diversifying engagements with multiple regional and extra-regional stakeholders have influenced a visible shift away from a somewhat conformist member of the developing world to one empowered to act as a pivot for global actors. This attitudinal change in posturing is energised by various minilateral engagements with competing actors, thus giving India the space to think along the lines of an emerging power.
Many overlaps and differences exist between the doctrines released a decade apart. This article will focus on some of the significant changes only.
Utility of Air Power
The previous doctrine was focused more on 20th-century aerial warfare and particularly sub-conventional warfare contingencies. It was also quite candid in discussing the major limitations of air power while highlighting the lack of political will to employ air power in sub-conventional contingencies, an apparent reference to Pakistan.
For now, it seems the IAF has incorporated punitive strikes in its training regimen, a testament to the politicisation of India’s military thinking.
The 2022 doctrine makes glowing reference to skirmishes with Pakistan (Balakot) and China (Ladakh) when discussing the might of air power. Beyond territorial defence, it postulates a larger regional role through which the IAF can secure India’s “national interests” in the Indian Ocean Region, making due mention of Modi’s Security And Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) policy.
Air Diplomacy
The previous doctrine cited cooperation with sister services and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations as notable cases of diplomacy. The revised doctrine makes particular reference to bilateral and multilateral exercises with extra-regional actors such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia.
As mentioned earlier, patronage and “partnership” with these countries during the successive Modi governments have imbued the Indian Armed Forces with greater confidence.
Air Power to Aerospace Power
The 2012 doctrine had a timid view of space power, remarking that it could not substitute for all other military capabilities or act as a panacea for informational gaps. Moreover, it was quite vocal about “rationalising” space power requirements instead of exploiting its resources to the maximum extent possible. It refers to this as the “availability and affordability” criteria and suggests an ad-hoc approach toward space power adoption.
In contrast, the 2022 doctrine not only explicitly advocates the shift from air power to aerospace power but also stresses greater space exploitation to achieve “national objectives”. It mentions India’s illustrious civilian space programme and suggests a civil-military fusion for space control which would also help to reduce dependence on external actors. Furthermore, it is proffered that increased aerospace power capabilities can help India engage more constructively with other nations.
Jointness
The IAF’s current leadership continues to harbour reservations about the structure of proposed theatre commands, fearing a downgrading of airpower and operational subservience to commanders from the land forces.
The 2012 doctrine claimed that air power “remains the lynchpin of any joint application of combat power in modern warfare”. The doctrine revised in 2022 goes a step further and declares aerospace power as the foundation for sustained land and maritime operations beyond physical operating mediums. Beyond doctrine, this assertion appears to amplify the IAF’s stated reservations.
No War, No Peace Strategy
A key innovation in the IAF’s doctrinal thinking is the elucidation of a No War, No Peace (NWNP) strategy, which is based on kinetic as well as non-kinetic prongs. One noteworthy aspect is Shaping Operations which includes Capability Demonstration; the doctrine describes it as the process of undertaking unspecified ‘tests’ and ‘trials’.
In early March 2022, a supersonic cruise missile (speculated to be the BrahMos) landed in Pakistani territory, ostensibly by “accident“. While India’s political and military leadership was quick to order an inquiry with the hopes of diverting global attention, a large segment of Pakistan’s strategic community is of the considered opinion that this launch was a deliberate attempt to assess Islamabad’s response. India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had admitted subtly before the parliament that the missile was mishandled due to “human error” as opposed to some technical malfunction, which lends further credence to reservations among Pakistan’s intelligentsia.
The term “shaping operations” has been borrowed from a draft 1998 US Army field manual which postulates that these consist of the application of military capabilities to set the condition for decisive operations. In his 1999 thesis, then US Army Major David R. Moore (Aviation) builds upon this concept and adds that shaping operations aim to reduce the adversary’s capability to coherently resist before or during the execution of a decisive operation. He adds further that the psychological effects of shaping operations could include preventing confrontation between opposing forces.
Major Kyle J. Wolfley, Assistant Professor at the US Military Academy, says that major powers use shaping “to proactively manage allies, friends, and adversaries in the hope of avoiding the need for warfighting or costly coercion. By using shaping effectively, these powers may obviate the need to react under disadvantageous conditions in the future.”
The IAF’s concept of shaping already includes Rapid Air Mobilisation and Deterrence through strategic assets; hence the goal of “capability demonstration” might refer to a mix of testing adversarial military preparedness and power projection. As India’s nuclear assets are under the control of the tri-services Strategic Forces Command (SFC), the ability to project combat potential through kinetic and non-kinetic tests and “trials” can be independently retained by the IAF as a flexible option in times other than war and peace. In this context, the “accidental” launch of a supersonic cruise missile into Pakistan can be considered the first practical manifestation of a shaping operation through kinetic means.
Another important aspect of the NWNP strategy is the conduct of “punitive strikes” as part of the External Security Operations prong for political signalling. The precedent for such “strikes” seems to be based on the Modi regime’s policy of espousing rhetoric and aggression against neighbouring countries to build internal political capital. It is unclear whether this doctrinal approach will continue in case parties other than the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) come to power in the centre. For now, it seems the IAF has incorporated punitive strikes in its training regimen, a testament to the politicisation of India’s military thinking.
Conclusion
A comprehensive reading of the IAF’s 2022 doctrine reveals a heightened sense of institutional assertiveness and the desire to achieve regional air power dominance with the help of allies and partners. The foundation of this new thinking rests on political leadership’s appetite to uphold an outward-looking posture and the operational utility of aerospace power.
The revised doctrine contrasts sharply with the 2012 version, which is somewhat inward-looking and rather timid in outlook. It goes without saying that the Modi regime’s politico-diplomatic engagements have helped inculcate grand strategic thought in the armed forces. Future governments in India’s centre will need to promote greater civil-military fusion in space operations to ensure that the IAF’s renewed outlook on the concept of warfighting can be realised within budgetary and resource constraints.
