Days after the killing of a top Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader, Omar Khalid Khorasani, in Afghanistan, the sudden appearance of the TTP militants in Swat raised concerns. Political leaders and the locals utterly rejected the regrouping of TTP fugitives. Hundreds of people in Swat, Dir, and North Waziristan held protests and demanded authorities take stern measures against terrorists in the region. Taking personnel from the Pakistan Army and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Police as hostages, who were later released, created intimidation and panic among the residents. The state’s response to the TTP’s suspected resurgence is critical to eliminating the possible menace. Otherwise, the country will pay the price of the outfit’s revival, and the state’s claim of victory against terrorism will become an illusion.
Ever since the Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan’s rule, it has significantly emboldened the Pakistani Taliban. The TTP leadership, along with its footsoldiers, are harbouring in Afghanistan without any constraints. The group’s presence in the country is estimated as one of the largest transnational terrorist groups having around 3000 – 4000 active fighters as per the latest UNSC released report. The outfit, now with increased cohesion, presents a grave danger to Pakistan’s security landscape. Attacks in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, and some other parts of KP, signify the TTP’s offensive posture that can disturb the ongoing peace talks, challenge the state’s writ and, in a way, reflects the group’s unwillingness to negotiate with the government.
Several protests have been held in Swat, Dir, Bajaur and Waziristan, demanding the state not to negotiate with the TTP and take harsh measures against their return.
Pakistan offered TTP to negotiate following the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of power in Afghanistan. TTP initially rejected the proposition of the former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, declaring the Pakistani constitution “un-Islamic”. Currently, the TTP is in talks with the PML(N) government, demanding the de-integration of the former FATA from the rest of the KP and absolute control of the region once again. The group demands resettling its members back in the region. The unexpected arrival of their armed members in Swat and the government’s inclination toward negotiations with the banned group is utterly unacceptable to the citizens. Several protests have been held in Swat, Dir, Bajaur and Waziristan, demanding the state not to negotiate with the TTP and take harsh measures against their return.
However, unlike in the past, the citizens’ approach toward terrorism is different this time. Their peaceful protests indicate robust support for the state authorities. In contrast, the state’s response to the locals’ demand for strict actions against the insurgents is still uncertain, as there is no proper retort to the TTP’s presence. The scenario is a test call for the government whether it continues peace talks with the TTP or dismisses them and takes kinetic measures against them.
Despite launching more than 1,237 kinetic operations, completing 2,600 km of 2,621 km Pak-Afghan border fencing, killing more than 18,000 terrorists and establishing law and order in the region, the rebirth of TTP in Swat makes the state’s triumph against terrorism questionable. The victory against terrorism, the informational control, and sustaining the military deterrence in the region after major military offensives have become debatable. The situation highlights that the future fighting potential of the TTP is still there.
Concerning the TTP’s presence in Swat valley, the military media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), released a statement four days after the incident – an overdue response to the locals’ misperceptions regarding the presence of a “large number of militants”. Confirming the presence of militants between Dir and Swat, sneaking from Afghanistan, ISPR’s stated words like “small number of armed men” and “located far away from population”. The terminology somehow indicates a limited or no threat to the state security landscape. However, their number and distance from the population do not matter. What does matter is the terrorists’ intrusion from a well-fenced and securitised border, terrorisation in the society and the group’s possible threat in the future. Hence, state authorities should not consider it a lesser threat. If the TTP members resettle themselves in ex-FATA and other associated areas like Dir and Swat, it might attract other transnational terrorists like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al Qaeda. Because historically, TTP has a close linkage with both groups. After the killing of Al Qaeda’s top leader, Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan might be deterred by the US drone strike and see their lives in danger. The TTP might provide Al Qaeda space to hide in Pakistan as the former may face challenges due to the US’ future drone strikes on its members in Afghanistan. If there is no proper control on the Pak-Afghan border, they might intrude from Afghanistan into Pakistan like the TTP’s recent intrusion in Swat. Therefore, keeping an eye on both the TTP in Swat and Al Qaeda’s probable entry into Pakistan is crucial.
Running amok in the valley, even in small numbers, and establishing a checkpoint in the area is a flagrant violation of the state’s laws. High-level security with sophisticated cameras and modern drones for surveillance is necessary for border control. Non-kinetic measures do not resolve the TTP problem because the country has a history of failed agreements with the group. Pakistan, in the past, never succeeded in a long-time truce or negotiation with the banned outfit. Even currently, both sides commenced talks, yet the TTP carried out several attacks across the country. Thus, the government should cobble up a plan of zero tolerance policy for terrorism. Furthermore, talks with the Afghan government on a collective response to the TTP presence in Afghanistan are also vital. The most recent killings of Khalid Khorasani, Abdul Rashid Uqabi Bajauri and Yasir Parakay, along with two other TTP members in Afghanistan, clearly signify TTP’s presence in Afghanistan.
For the country’s authorities, this is the time to win the hearts and minds of the locals who demand stringent countermeasures. Negotiating with terrorists and keeping up with their demands is not a solution to combat terrorism. Sometimes, the past predicts the future. Before reconciling with the TTP, it is imperative for the state to closely observe the people’s perceptions, reactions of the victims’ families, Pakistan’s position in the FATF, and the credibility of such talks in accomplishing long-term peace in the region.
