The relationship between the United States (US) and Saudi Arabia is a longstanding partnership that has evolved over the past eight decades and is shaped by common interests and mutual respect. They are strong economic partners and pursue security cooperation. A prominent feature of the US-Saudi Arabia ties is the role of the administration in the two countries. To bridge a strong connection between Washington and Riyadh, the Biden administration has optimised the normalisation of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel as an issue of national security.
Similarly, in recent times, the US-Saudi Arabia relationship has been evolving under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) as Saudi Arabia seeks to adapt to a changing global and regional landscape. In 2022, the US experienced a critical bilateral dynamic with Saudi Arabia, given a fallout due to MBS’s political outlook. This illustrated some dilemmas in recalibrating policy engagement with a confident and assertive Saudi leadership.
Therefore, domestic politics in the US is driving Biden’s approach, which views Saudi-Israel normalisation as a “foreign policy win” for himself. President Biden has been pushing for a significant Middle East deal involving the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The potential pact aims to normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, contingent on concessions from Israel to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution for Palestinians. This move could have a transformative impact, potentially surpassing the Camp David peace treaty.
However, with regard to the recognition of Israel, Saudi Arabia, despite the Abraham Accords, remains steadfastly committed to its 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and endorsed by all Arab League member states. The initiative calls for “a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East,” which, among other things, links any normalisation or recognition of Israel with (a) withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including but not limited to southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights; and (b) the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian State.
The potential pact aims to normalise relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, contingent on concessions from Israel to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution for Palestinians.
On the other hand, the barriers in US-Saudi Arabia relations include Saudi’s deepening relationship with China as a source of concern for the US that would preclude Washington from sharing certain military hardware, intelligence, and high-tech systems with Saudi Arabia. Consequently, as the Chinese-Saudi partnership grows, it will make Israel hesitant towards normalising relations with Saudi Arabia and the US bridging effort. Riyadh’s demands to Washington can also be seen as an obstacle to US-Saudi Arabia relations. According to reports, these include NATO-level mutual security treaties or guarantees and a commitment to continue supplying front-line US military equipment, technology, and services and support for a domestic civil nuclear program. The additional demand stands out as it entails a bilateral civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement that fully preserves Saudi Arabia’s rights to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as guaranteed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under section 123 of the 1945 US Atomic Energy Act.
The case of Saudi Arabia to build nuclear plants is based on multiple arguments from the US bilateral agreements with certain states. According to reports, Riyadh’s current nuclear plans involve building two nuclear power plants (NPPs), a reduction from its ambitious 2013 proposal for 16 NPPs. For its part, the US continues to press Saudi Arabia to accept the so-called “gold standard” of never enriching uranium or reprocessing spent or used nuclear reactor fuel, as well as to implement the IAEA’s “additional protocol” to Riyadh’s NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA—as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has done.
No other non-nuclear-weapons nation with a “123 agreement” has embraced the so-called “gold standard,” and neither has Saudi Arabia, which wishes to maintain the option of uranium enrichment for nuclear energy usage now that Iran has been allowed to do so under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Furthermore, many in Washington are opposed to providing Saudi Arabia with a formal security guarantee, and the US Congress is unlikely to adopt a formal treaty to that effect.
Another complicating factor is that the “Agreed Minute” to the 2009 UAE-US “123 agreement” states that if the US enters into a more favourable “123” agreement with another Middle Eastern country, the US must amend the “123 agreement” on equally favourable terms to the UAE.
Unfortunately, Riyadh appears to have excluded from its demands that the US may bring Israel to the table at the UN Conference for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Overall, the significant changes in Saudi foreign policy have affected its bilateral relations with the US. Subsequently, the US may reflect on the ways to communicate and continue to collaborate with Saudi Arabia as an important partner in the region. The bridges and barriers are required to be sorted out to advance mutual interests and a vision for a more secure, stable, and prosperous region interconnected with the world.
