After the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) had started a “Pakistan Bachao March” from Karachi to Islamabad on 22 May 2023, it reached a 12-point agreement with the government through Rana Sanaullah and Ayaz Sadiq in June. Half of these points were related to tackling blasphemy, a central issue on which the TLP’s platform is based. While the group also requested the government to lift any restrictions on online coverage of the group, as well on the freedom of movement of its leaders, write to United States (US) authorities for the release of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, reduce petrol and diesel prices, and promote Urdu as the official language of governmental written communications.

Past TLP-Government Negotiations

Having allegedly entered mainstream politics following the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri in 2011 for the assassination of Salman Taseer, this was not the first time that the TLP has managed to secure concessions from the government. In 2017, the TLP called off its three-week-long sit-in in Islamabad after the Law Minister, Zahid Hamid, agreed to resign following a change to the oath of elected representatives, the promise of releasing those arrested, and for the publication of the report of the Raja Zafarul Haq-led committee formed to investigate who was responsible for the “clerical error” leading to the change in the oath, relating to the Khatam-e-Nabuwwat clause. Khatam-e-Nabuwwat refers to the finality of Prophethood that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is the last of the prophets, and none can succeed him. Consequently, the government promulgated the Elections Act 2017, which included in the declaration for all electoral candidates that they believe in the concept of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat.

Not all negotiations between the TLP and the government have reaped the results that the TLP wanted, however. After the acquittal of Asia Bibi in October 2018, who was charged with blasphemy, the TLP led a sit-in across the country. Then-Prime Minister Imran Khan agreed not to oppose the TLP if they sought to appeal the decision, but the Supreme Court eventually rejected the appeal and upheld the result in January 2019. Similarly, in November 2020, the TLP led protests blocking a highway to Islamabad after France’s President Macron defended the right to show blasphemous cartoons in the country following the beheading of a teacher who had shown such content in his class. Khan’s government signed a deal with the TLP that it would consider both expelling the French ambassador and a boycott of French goods.

The contents of the deal are also not limited to reversing actions taken by the government against the TLP and its anti-blasphemy interests. Rather, it contains new proactive directives for the government to follow.

After the government did not expel the ambassador, the TLP protested again in April 2021, and its leader, Saad Hussain Rizvi, was arrested, which only made the unrest worse. The government thus listed the TLP as a proscribed organisation under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for the violence over three days it unleashed in response to the arrest. The TLP did finally get its way after “secret talks” with the government, agreeing to end the use of agitation and sit-ins in return for the revocation of the order listing the TLP as a proscribed organisation in November 2021 and the release of Rizvi.

What’s Different About this Deal?

This most recent deal with the TLP is thus different because the government did not wait until a disruptive sit-in to come to an agreement. The contents of the deal are also not limited to reversing actions taken by the government against the TLP and its anti-blasphemy interests. Rather, it contains new proactive directives for the government to follow, including speedy trials of blasphemy cases, the implementation of filters to block blasphemous content online, the establishment of a Counter Blasphemy Wing under the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and the booking of those charged under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. So the deal is not purely reactionary.

Given that it is not clear what the Counter Blasphemy Wing will entail as of now, this article will focus on the booking of those charged under Section 295-C under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The Third Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act allows its court to try offences relating to the following “to the exclusion of any other Court”:

• Abduction or kidnapping for ransom;
• Use of firearms or explosives by any device in any place of worship, whether or not any hurt or damage is caused;
• Firing or use of explosives by any device in the court premises.

Justice Project Pakistan (JPP) has already raised concerns about this aspect of the Act, arguing that it gives the “Anti-Terrorism Courts exclusive jurisdiction to try certain offences” regardless of whether these offences constitute terrorism or not. The organisation also stated that the government could amend the Schedule as it sees fit, which gives the Anti-Terrorism Court an “exceptionally wide ambit” to try criminal offences exclusively in the court, and it may well be amended after this deal with the TLP to include the offence of Section 295-C, which allocates the death penalty for the use of derogatory remarks about the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).

The decision to allow those charged under Section 295-C to be booked under the Anti-Terrorism Act may thus allow the criminal offence to be decided in the Anti-Terrorism Courts as opposed to the criminal courts. This has the potential to undermine the fundamental rights of the accused because, as the JPP has stated, Section 21-H allows the court to admit a confession made during a police investigation as evidence, which is not otherwise possible in criminal cases. Despite the Act affirming it must be made without compulsion, it would be difficult to prove that any confessions were indeed given without compulsion or torture. Section 295-C, alongside other offences relating to religion, is commonly known to be weaponised to settle personal disputes, and so this move could contribute to further miscarriages of justice.

To conflate the use of derogatory remarks about the Prophet (peace be upon him) and terrorism would also alter the connotations of what it means to commit terrorism, even if the definition of terrorism is not changed in the Act itself. Protection of the sanctity of both the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Prophethood has increasingly become enshrined within the constitution and the criminal laws, such that it has also become synonymous with loyalty to the state. Therefore, blurring the lines between blasphemy and terrorism through case law would further contribute to this. The gradual association between the protection of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat and loyalty to the state has also played a prominent role in justifying the criminalisation of the Ahmadiyyah community, as per sections 298-B and 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code.

Conclusions

Despite not having any representation in the National Assembly, the TLP are increasingly able to influence Pakistan’s treatment of blasphemy aimed at the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) through the threat of marching on the capital. The government appears to have acquiesced once more, which confirms how earlier concessions by previous governments did set a dangerous precedent. One might sympathise with a desire to prevent unnecessary death and destruction through TLP sit-ins, but the consequences of this deal will likely be significant. This move not only has the potential to damage Pakistan’s international relations with those countries who have previously been the subject of the TLP’s ire, namely France, but the booking of those charged under Section 295-C under the Anti-Terrorism Act could also restrict the fundamental rights of the accused if they are to proceed in the Anti-Terrorism Court. This is at a time when many lawyers are challenging the proposed trial of civilians in military courts, too, because of the lack of necessary safeguards for the accused. As with questions over what the Counter Blasphemy Wing will be and how it will operate, there should be an air of uncertainty and concern over what consequences this agreement, if honoured, will have for Pakistan.